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I. What was/is Political Geography
Thank you very much for inviting me to Osaka. 
So what I had in mind today is really to give 
something of an overview of political geogra-
phy in the United States. So my claims are not 
beyond the borders of the United States in terms 
of the trends of the field. What I would like to do 
is to start out with something about the prehis-
tory of political geography, in this case not just in 
the United States but more generally. Because, 
I think, around the world until, really, quite 
recently, the 1960s and 1970s political geography 
in many ways would become very much associ-
ated with its past, and in particular the fact that 
it grew up in this period of time, particularly from 
the 1890s to the 1940s that I and other people 
have called the period of inter-imperial rivalry. So 
that in many ways political geography was tied 
to the geopolitical period in which the word itself 
became associated with the subject of the study.
And so I list here some of the connotations that 
political geography came to have particularly in 
the 1940s and the 1950s. So thus this was here. 
First of all, imperial rivalry is a kind of basic 
feature of world politics. Lying behind this was 
a very strong environmental determinism, par-
ticularly the idea or ideas such as the distinction 
between sea and land powers was very important 
one; one could identify countries with a particular 
type of power. So Britain and Japan were seen 
as sea powers and Germany and Russia as land 
powers, for example. Thirdly, geopolitics was 
really the central feature of political geography 
to the extent that the word ʻpolitical geographyʼ 
and the word ʻgeopoliticsʼ really were not read-
ily distinguishable from one and another, even 
though many people who used the term ʻpolitical 
geography,ʼ the British geographer Mackinder is 
a good example. [He] never used the word geo-
politics. I mean, it never occurred in any of his 
writings or in any of his speeches. But in the pop-
ular imagination it did get that association. The 
focus was heavily on the behavior of the so-called 
great powers, the worldʼs most powerful countries 
rather than anyone else pretty much. It had very 
strong associations in all of the countries where 
it took root, all of them – not just Japan and 
Germany, which is the way in which itʼs often 
told, but also in Britain and the United States – 
with nationalism, with exceptionalism; not only 
weʼre different from other people but weʼre better 
than other people. And then finally, particularly 
in Germany and in Britain where it was really 
quite a strong subject in the inter-war period in 
the 1920s and the 1930s, it also was very Euro-
centric. So for example, there was a tendency 
there to dismiss Japan as not really having any 
great significance because often connected to the 
environmental determinism was also a very deep-
seated racism, about the superiority of Europeans 
and so on. So these were very important features 
of classical political geography.
Perhaps one of the most important things 
that lead to its discrediting was the idea that 
you could both be kind of scientific and objective 
claiming that this or that country was the land 
power or sea power, to use that example. And yet 
（講演）
64 John Agnew
at the same time most of the people who were 
active in political geography were very much 
proponents of their own particular country. So it 
was always read through the glasses, if you like, 
of Britain or Germany or Japan and so on and so 
forth. And so there was this attempt to try and 
to bring together a sort of objective view of the 
world, scientific view of the world, but using it 
in a sense for a particular countryʼs interests or 
stakes in the world. Now this was precisely what 
made political geography popular with political 
leaders, but it was precisely what after World 
War II came to discredit the field, I think. Thatʼs 
the point.
So in the United States down until the 1960s 
teaching political geography largely disappeared. 
There were two or three text books but they were 
largely just descriptions of different countries 
around the world. To the extent there was a tra-
dition, it was a continuation of Isaiah Bowmanʼs 
kind of political geography, which was mainly sort 
of lists of characteristics of places, border disputes 
of one sort or another, a little discussion of the 
status of different countries in terms of their geo-
political position, but that was about it. In my own 
case, for example, as an undergraduate I never 
had a course in political geography, simply because 
the university I attended didnʼt teach it; there was 
no course. And so it was only in late 1960s that the 
subject began to revive, people started to use the 
term again, political geography, and weʼll talk in 
a minute about the types of work or research that 
were talked about. But at the moment I just want 
to talk a little bit about why I think it – why did it 
revive? I mean, why didnʼt it just completely die? 
And I think there are a number of reasons and Iʼll 
just go into those now.
So I think there are a number of reasons why 
there was a revival of interest in trying to con-
nect together questions – political questions on 
the one side and questions of space and territory 
on the other. One of these was the end of, the 
collapse of the European empires in the 1960s, 
particularly the British and French empires and 
trying to explain – trying to understand how 
this happened. It made the world suddenly seem 
much more dynamic and less fixed than it had 
been in the years right after World War II. I think 
thatʼs important. Secondly, the Cold War really 
took a very different turn, thatʼs the conflict 
between the United States and its allies on the 
one side and Soviet Union and its allies on the 
other, took a very different turn in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s – away from just a kind of sense 
of perpetual confrontation, the emergence par-
ticularly of conflicts in the so-called Third World. 
And people were beginning to try and understand 
how the world itself was being divided up into 
these different spheres of influence and inter-
est. The Soviet Union on its side, the United 
States on its side and then the so-called Third 
World in-between. And in particular, the conflict 
between China and the Soviet Union beginning 
in the late 1950s really undermined the idea 
of a completely homogenous communist world. 
Particularly in the United States, I think, this 
was important, the Sino-Soviet dispute, where 
it became apparent that there were other issues 
besides the questions of U.S. versus Soviet style 
economic organization and so on.
And I think another thing that happened 
in the 1960s – and particularly in the United 
States and in Western Europe – was an increas-
ing self-criticism of the nature of the societies 
themselves, particularly in the U.S. The Civil 
Rights movement was questioning the use of lan-
guage that had been used to present the United 
States in relation to the rest of the world: land 
of freedom, land of democracy and so on. Here 
were people who were saying, “Well, we donʼt 
get to vote.” I mean itʼs very difficult for African 
Americans in many parts of the America South 
to register to vote. How is that different from 
Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union? And so I 
think this again created a sense of crisis in the 
image of a set of stable, geographical categories 
between the Soviet Union on the one side and the 
United States on the other. And then finally, I 
think an important factor partly associated with 
decolonization, but also with a kind of increasing 
crisis within so-called western countries as well 
was a revival of nationalism, often of a kind of 
small-nation nationalism. In the case of Europe 
the beginnings of – revival of Irish nationalism, 
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Scottish nationalism, Basque nationalism in 
Spain, the increased frictions between language 
groups in Belgium; all of these things began in 
the 1960s. So there was an increasing sense, 
and ironically, that the world that we thought 
was spatially fixed, territorially fixed was in fact 
much more mobile, much more labile that it pre-
viously had been the case, and you need to have 
somebody who took an interest in explaining why 
this was the case. Well, how do we understand 
these kinds of dynamics?
II. Five subject-areas of political 
geography today
So what Iʼd like to do is now to provide something 
of the historical background and what Iʼd like to do 
for the rest of my time today in the presentation 
is to say something briefly about each of these 
– Iʼll come back to these and look at examples 
of them in a minute – of the subject areas that 
emerged beginning in the 1960s, so we still have 
some traditional ones, ʻgeopolitics.ʼ This ʻspatial/
territorial organization of states and empiresʼ [is 
approached] not just in terms of state formation 
but in terms of how theyʼre organized internally: 
federal versus unitary systems, systems of local 
government and so on and so forth. But the new 
topic – so usually considered under these three 
at the bottom, ʻgeographies of social and political 
movements,ʼ part of which is so-called electoral 
geography, looking at election results and trying 
to use them as a way of trying to understand 
social and political change. [The next subject 
area concerns] how people become attached to 
particular places and the political identities that 
are associated with them. And then finally, ʻgeog-
raphies of nationalism and ethnic conflictʼ has 
become a really major area of study in political 
geography.
And I would argue that all of these – the form 
studying these has taken, weʼll see in a minute 
– is a response to exactly these new challenges 
or new problems that emerged beginning in the 
1960s. So there is a connection between politi-
cal geography, if you like, on the one hand, the 
academic political geography on the one hand, 
and then the world and whatʼs happening in it 
on the other. This isnʼt a world separate from the 
real world as we often think of them. We have 
the phrase ʻivory towerʼ for the university. But in 
fact a part of the argument of my book Making 
Political Geography is that political geography 
is like a kind of dialectic or a dance, if you like, 
between trying to understand the world and the 
world itself, so that thereʼs a kind of attempt any-
where trying to keep these together, even as the 
world itself is changing then political geography 
has changed as well.
III. Three theoretical perspectives
1. Spatial-analytic perspective
So Iʼm going to return to these shortly because 
this is going to be the main way in which Iʼm 
going to organize looking at some examples of 
thinking in a kind of political geographical way 
about these. But before I do that, I just want to 
talk about the three theoretical and methodologi-
cal perspectives that have risen within American 
political geography since the 1960s. In a strange 
way each kind has come in sequence. So what 
Iʼm going to call the spatial-analytic approach 
really dates from the 1960s and 1970s. The 
political-economic, which Iʼll explain in a little 
bit more in a minute, really from the 1970s and 
80s and then the so-called postmodern [approach] 
is really from the 1990s to the present. But I 
think itʼs a mistake to think of these as some-
how one replacing the other. Thatʼs not what I 
have in mind. As each has risen, thereʼs still lots 
of research thatʼs being done across these tra-
ditions. So thereʼs still a lot of spatial-analytic 
research, political-economic, and so on. So itʼs not 
that one is being replaced by the other. I think 
thatʼs a very important point. Thatʼs the first 
point.
The second point is that these are, in a sense, 
heuristic devices. Itʼs a way of creating, simpli-
fying a much more complex set of theoretical 
perspectives. And there are inevitable overlaps 
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between these. So again, I donʼt want to leave 
you with the impression that these are com-
pletely separate positions because thereʼs some 
research that overlaps these categories. So these 
categories are just a convention, a way of trying 
to make sense of a much more complex sort of 
set of positions. So maybe you can say something 
about that and then Iʼll come back and try and 
describe each of these. But those caveats are very 
important to me.
So these three positions, these three perspec-
tives then are bearing those two points in mind 
that theyʼre overlapping rather than completely 
separate, really are about different strategies as 
well as emphasis in terms of thinking about the 
various subject areas that weʼre going to return 
to in a moment. The spatial-analytic perspective 
really begins with a map. There is always a map 
to start with. I mean one of the things that makes 
all of these positions in a way geographical is that 
they are all about maps or about cartography. So 
in a sense weʼve inherited from the past a heavy 
reliance on visualizing relations in the world in 
terms of mapping or mapping strategies. But the 
spatial-analytic perspective always begins with 
a map. One starts with a map and in a way youʼre 
always – and this is one of the criticisms of the 
position often, you end with the map because the 
map is the way in which you interpret things. So 
for example, the whole area of GIS in contempo-
rary geography is about layers, putting layers on 
a map, of having some underlying relationship 
that you are interested in and showing by cor-
relating, essentially through geo-correlation, by 
showing how things are related to one another. 
So thatʼs what I mean by spatial-analytic because 
it is very analytical, but itʼs based on in essence 
putting various empirical indicators together on 
a map. And all of this, I hope, will become clear 
when we look at some examples. But thatʼs what 
I mean by the spatial-analytic approach.
2. Political-economic perspective
The second perspective really grew up as a 
reaction against the spatial-analytic. So in geog-
raphy, I mean this label is often most associated 
with, in American geography, writers like David 
Harvey or Neil Smith. Some of you have probably 
heard of them or in political geography perhaps 
most importantly, Peter Taylor. So youʼre proba-
bly familiar with some of these names. And it was 
very much a critique of spatial analysis mainly 
because from this perspective space itself really 
doesnʼt matter. Space is always about outcomes 
of more profound political and economic pro-
cesses. So a question is relating to the interests of 
different groups, particularly of social classes but 
of other groups of business interests and so on, 
and the political struggles between such inter-
ests on the one hand and then competing ones 
on the other, so that the map then is an outcome; 
the map appears at the end. Itʼs the end product 
rather than the beginning. So from this point of 
view what youʼre trying to do is to establish the 
connections between a particular phenomenon, 
like some of the things weʼll look at in a minute, 
and a different subject; here is like votes for dif-
ferent parties. These are going to be the result 
of people supporting or not supporting political 
parties on the basis of their economic interests, 
just to use – thatʼs a very simple example for that 
– the one you could use.
3. Postmodern perspective
And the postmodern perspective really begins 
as a critique of both of the others. From this point 
of view, the focus here is that thereʼs something 
missing. Thereʼs something missing from both of 
the other perspectives, which is the role of human 
consciousness and human language, particu-
larly the way we represent the world. We donʼt 
approach the world as a blank slate, which in many 
ways is the assumption of human behavior that 
lies behind the first two. Now we approach with 
all kinds of assumptions, cultural, ideological 
assumptions about the world, and these are actu-
ally wired into the language that we use. So the 
language that we use to describe the world and 
try to understand the world has also then to be 
part of how we explain or understand the world. 
So the emphasis here is very much on dominant 
source of narratives, stories, discourses, some-
times the term that you use, so that for example 
if you want to understand, as weʼll talk in a few 
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minutes with a good example I think, something 
like nationalism, you canʼt just take a vote for a 
nationalist party as given without understanding 
“What is it that theyʼre appealing to?” “What 
kind of representations are at stake?” “Where 
did these come from?” and “How did they arise in 
the first place?” So the postmodern perspective 
then shifts the focus away from the map as the 
starting point as with the spatial-analytic or as 
an outcome in the political-economic, to ask “How 
do we construct the map in the first place?” “What 
assumptions go into our kind of way of structur-
ing the world?” And these are usually collective 
representations associated with a particular pow-
erful group or a powerful country that then, in a 
sense, imposes these sorts of representations on 
the rest of the world.
IV. Connecting theoretical perspec-
tives and subject-areas in Political 
Geography
1. Geopolitics
So what Iʼd like to do next before coming back 
to these three emerging things at the end is to 
go through the different subject-areas and the 
three theoretical perspectives just to try and 
give, I think, a better understanding from a more 
empirical point of view, because I think one of 
the things about – that remains true of political 
geography is that it remains – even though weʼre 
interested in these theoretical perspectives, weʼre 
also very interested in empirical material as well. 
So in that way I think weʼre trying to preserve a 
connection, which I think is part of the geograph-
ical tradition, which is always to be engaging 
with the world, never to be just engaging in some 
kind of theoretical debate, like one fine same 
philosophy or something. So for me this is a very 
important part of political geography that it 
remains in a sense engaged with the world rather 
than in a sense isolating itself from it.
So briefly anyway I want to go through just 
giving an example of each of the perspectives, 
each of the theoretical perspectives, the three 
theoretical perspectives in relation to differ-
ent subject areas. So here even though he is a 
representative of classical political geography, 
Mackinderʼs model of the heartland here, which 
is probably familiar to most political geographers, 
is very much a kind of spatial analysis. I mean 
it doesnʼt really – it may make some assumptions, 
some political, economic assumptions about 
– particularly about the role of railways. But 
thatʼs about it. I mean mainly itʼs about dominat-
ing land area as opposed to – and the Eurasia, 
obviously in this case, as opposed to being a sea 
power. Mackinder of course was interested in 
the prospects of the British empire and that was 
what was driving his research; it wasnʼt disinter-
ested search for truth, something like that. But 
he was very worried about the rise of Germany 
and so that was the immediate context for his 
drawing of this particular map.
But this is a map that begins and ends. I mean 
itʼs very much a kind of equivalent of what we can 
think of as spatial analysis. The basic breakdown 
here is between land and sea powers, and the 
threat thatʼs now posed to sea powers, of which 
he has Britain very much in mind, by the rise of 
Germany which he sees as the quintessential land 
power. So even though this map predates the three 
theoretical perspectives – Iʼm not sure Mackinder 
would see himself in that category – one can see 
his map as an example of a kind of spatial anal-
ysis. And of the attraction of it, itʼs a very simple 
and seductive idea based on a kind of opposition 
of – whatʼs seen as a fundamental opposition, 
and yet in this opposition often, as many people 
have pointed out, doesnʼt stand up to very close 
scrutiny. I mean, none of these powers ever was 
completely one of the other, a land power or a sea 
power. And then the rise of air power of course 
turns the whole thing into something less than 
convincing. But nevertheless itʼs an example of 
using a map as a kind of form or persuasive car-
tography and I introduce it here mainly just as to 
point out the degree to which there is some kind 
of continuity between classical political geography 
and more recent thinking.
If we turn now to the political-economic per-
spective on geopolitics, I have a couple of maps I 
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want to show. This is one which is taken from the 
French magazine Le Monde Diplomatique , and it 
has a lot of their cartographic conventions on it. 
But it focuses very much here on whatʼs at stake 
in Asia in terms of U.S. policy towards China. So 
this map was drawn in the months following the 
so-called debate in the United States about the 
pivot to Asia – some of you probably remember 
that – which was a statement as if there was 
some kind of new American focus on East Asia. 
But the discussion here was very much in terms 
of bases and in terms of U.S. efforts contain-
ing China. So the model here was very much of 
containment.
But lurking behind this map was more of this 
map. So from a political-economic perspective it 
wasnʼt just about containing China militarily, but 
lurking in the background is much more; this is 
a measure of intra-Asian bilateral foreign direct 
investment flows. So lurking behind it is more the 
question of the economic rise in China, so that 
from a political-economic perspective U.S. policy, 
as illustrated in the first map, is in many ways 
responding much more to this. Itʼs not about just 
the rise of China in some kind of abstract way as 
in previous perspective – if somebody else rises, 
you must fall, that kind of classic geopolitical 
argument. But here itʼs very much about the rise 
of China and the challenge in essence this poses 
to the whole U.S.-based world economy that has 
emerged in East Asia over the last 40 or 50 years. 
So China now interferes with the connectivities 
of Japan, Taiwan, interestingly Australia, New 
Zealand, and so on, rather than it just being a 
question of the rise of China as a military power. 
What matters here is very much what lies behind 
that, so that what Iʼm trying to get at here is that 
this map – behind this map lies this diagram, if 
you see what I mean. Itʼs not this map in itself 
that tells you whatʼs going on; itʼs this that tells 
you whatʼs happening on the other map. So this is 
very much a kind of political-economic approach 
to geopolitics that lying behind what appear to 
be questions purely of military strategy are these 
questions of economic challenge.
And so that brings us here to the third, the 
postmodern perspective on geopolitics, and this 
obviously something of a parody but itʼs a map 
again drawn in originally. The original was in Le 
Monde Diplomatique , and is a map of the world 
according to the former American President, 
President Bush, in terms of friends and enemies 
among those who count around the world, using 
the sort of language that was used by the former 
President, outposts of tyranny, for example, for 
Cuba, North Korea, Myanmar, Belorussia, Iran 
and Zimbabwe, an interestingly eclectic list, 
places that were hostile to the U.S., but possibly 
useful subjects and then, of course, the greatest 
competitors to the U.S.
So if you like, this is an attempt of doing the 
mental map of the world of George W. Bush, and 
as I said, itʼs something of a parody. Iʼm not sug-
gesting this as a serious analysis but what it does 
is to draw attention to the fact that the relations 
between states, the geopolitics of interstate rela-
tions, if you like, is always mediated by the sort 
of images and imaginations that political leaders 
bring to bear. So in this case you may remember 
a very famous speech – well, ʻinfamous speechʼ is 
a better way of putting it – that President Bush 
made about the so-called axis of evil. So here we 
have the language of morality imposed on the 
world map and that was also a very peculiar axis 
because it involved Iraq – this is before the over-
throw of Saddam Hussein – Iraq, Iran and North 
Korea as a strange axis. But this is I think more 
interesting, an attempt at using an older lan-
guage. You may remember the axis during World 
War II of Germany, Italy and Japan, the so-called 
Axis Powers. This was the term that was used 
in the United States. So hereʼs an effort at also 
using a historical analogy to try and inform cur-
rent American foreign policy, and I think thatʼs 
an interesting aspect then of this perspective. So 
you canʼt just look at the world as if itʼs about 
interests and so on. Itʼs about establishing identi-
ties and in this case all of this is about reinforcing 
a kind of American identity in relation to the rest 
of the world, in this case using language from 
previous periods when the United States was in 
battle in relation to the rest of the world. And so 
this map is from around that time, from around 
2003, 2004, which some of you may remember.
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2. Spatial/Territorial organization of 
states and empires
So moving on and doing the same kind of thing 
again, here we have the question of the political 
map of – in this case of Europe. And so from a 
spatial-analytic perspective whatʼs interesting 
here is how of the form that this takes today, the 
shapes that the countries take and that how we 
can look at their characteristics, how they were 
formed in terms of, for example, their relative 
size, and the settlement distribution within them. 
Particularly important in this kind of approach 
would be the degree to which they are dominated 
by one city, a capital city typically. So at least in 
the original, France does appear on this map. And 
Paris of course dominates France, its absolute 
primate city. But in Germany for example there 
are quite a few cities of more or less the same 
size scattered across the country, which tells you 
something about the history of Germany. As a 
state it was bringing together in the 19th cen-
tury a pre-existing set of states. And so Munich, 
Frankfurt, Hamburg, Berlin are not that differ-
ent in relative size and obviously, historically, 
Berlin became the most important of those cities, 
but of course, it shrank during the period when 
Germany was divided into eastern and western 
parts.
But the point here is that a spatial-analytic 
approach takes the map as it is and asks us some-
thing about the nature of the borders between 
these states, “What kind of border there is?” 
“How this border was established?” The internal 
organization of the territory, “Is it a unitary or 
is it a federal system?” and “How that connects 
to the question of the settlement structure of a 
particular country?” So again, what I should do 
here is to put a map of the settlement structure 
in particular and the degree to which a country 
is federal or unitary on top of this map. A very 
important example of this approach is that taken 
by the Norwegian political geographer/sociologist 
Stein Rokkan, who wrote a whole series of papers 
and a book on state formation in Europe, essen-
tially making this kind of argument and saying 
that it reflected both a kind of east-west divi-
sion within Europe – which is based around the 
history of urbanization in Europe – and an urban 
belt flowing from Italy up through Germany and 
into the Netherlands, and then a north-south dif-
ference based around which parts of Europe were 
parts of the Roman empire and which parts were 
not. So itʼs a historical spatial analytic kind of 
approach, but itʼs about putting one map, if you 
like, on top of another and thatʼs why I wanted to 
use this as an example.
The second example I have is about the unifi-
cation of Italy. What I intended here was to show 
that in fact the unification of Italy, which finally 
took place in 1871, was a product really of a polit-
ical-economic process and in particular the rise 
of the Kingdom of Sardinia, as it was called then, 
whose capital was Turin in Northwestern Italy. 
So the major agent for the unification of Italy was 
the government of the Kingdom of Sardinia. And 
Sardinia was just the island – it was the island of 
Sardinia down here, but more importantly a large 
part of the northwest of Italy, the area today 
around Turin and Genoa, so that part of Italy.
And in particular businesses located in that 
area in the mid-19th century were very concerned 
about building [a unified state] at a time when 
there was increasingly sort of national compe-
tition across Europe; remember this is the time 
also of the unification of Germany. So here the 
focus of state formation is on who was involved 
in it, who was, if you like, behind it. And the idea 
here is that there was a political economic elite in 
Northwestern Italy who became the major agents 
then of trying to put together what had histori-
cally been a very politically fragmented state.
And of course the big challenge that they faced 
was the papacy. So the big problem in unifying 
Italy as it had been for a long time was how to 
persuade the Pope to abandon the fact that he 
controlled this territory in Central Italy, quite 
substantial area here. A large chunk had been 
lost in 1860 by the Pope. So by 1870 there was 
only this part of Italy that was left to be incorpo-
rated into the new Kingdom of Italy. And the elite 
from the Northwest was so convinced of the right-
ness of their cause that they even were willing to 
be subject to ex-communication from the church, 
from the Catholic Church, by the Pope, which is 
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what happened to them in exchange for unifying 
Italy, which was quite a cost to bear, so that the 
new king of Italy, for example, was not allowed 
to take mass, to go to church. And the Pope of 
course from 1870 until 1929 refused to recognize 
the legitimacy of the new state of Italy.
But lying behind it from this perspective was a 
process of trying to create an economic unit actu-
ally, not particularly a political unit. It was a very 
famous phrase used by an Italian politician in the 
1860s, he said, “We have created Italy, now we 
must create the Italians,” the opposite way around 
from how we typically think of nation formation 
– nation-state formation. I think whatʼs interest-
ing in this case is itʼs a good example of how you 
can make an economic argument about national 
unification.
So the last example in relation to state and 
empire formation is about United States. And the 
Idea here is that – and this is in a postmodern 
perspective – originally the settlement was 
just along the coast. But in the geographical 
imagination of people like Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison, two of the founding fathers of 
the United States when it became independent 
from Britain in 1787, was to spread settlement 
beyond the Appalachian Mountains. Some of you 
may know that one of the objections that some of 
the American settlers had to British government 
policy after 1763 was that the British govern-
ment insisted that Americans could not settle 
beyond the Appalachian Mountains, because of 
treaties that Britain had with France and with a 
variety of Indian nations beyond the Appalachian 
Mountains. But in the imagination, particularly 
of Madison, was the notion of creating a country 
that would expand westwards. And if we look at 
the map of the United States here you see this 
kind of inexorable movement from one coast to 
another. Now obviously some of these things 
were major historical contingencies, the fact, for 
example, that Napoleon in 1803 decided that he 
would sell this huge tract of land, the so-called 
Louisiana Purchase, to the United States, and so 
they acquired that without any kind of conquest 
at all.
But as you can see further to the West a lot 
of this was either conquest, as in the case of the 
U.S.-Mexican War of 1847, or annexation of one 
kind or another. And lying behind this was a 
geographical imagination certainly at the found-
ing, but by the 1840s this had actually become 
something called Manifest Destiny – I donʼt know 
whether you are familiar with that phrase – 
that in a sense there was an inevitability to this 
[action] that the United States should stretch 
from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean and that it 
could in fact perhaps even stretch further north 
and also further south. So this was a process of 
both state and empire formation. I mean it was 
the creation of a huge continental state. But lying 
behind it was this perception, this conception, of 
a continent-wide state. So you canʼt just see it as 
a kind of arbitrary accretion or bringing together 
pieces of territory, but that lying behind it was a 
justifying idea, the idea of an American empire 
which was a term that Jefferson used. And then 
by the 1840s this was destined to happen, as in 
the phrase Manifest Destiny.
3. Geography of social and polit ical 
movements
So turning to the third subject area and this 
of course was a new one in the 1960s and 70s. 
Arguably the ones weʼve just been looking at had 
been part of political geography from the start. 
So what I have here or the first two are a couple 
of maps of the western parts of United States, 
of the Pacific states, California, Washington, 
Oregon, Hawaii and Alaska. And this first one is 
of changes in the vote between the 2004 and 2008 
presidential elections. And itʼs an interesting – I 
thought this was an interesting example from a 
spatial-analytic perspective. And a lot of research 
in electoral geography is done from this perspec-
tive. So itʼs about mapping the vote and then 
trying to correlate that vote with various charac-
teristics of the districts where the vote went one 
way or the other.
So my example of a spatial-analytic approach 
would be to take a map like this – this is some-
thing I wrote in an atlas of the 2008 presidential 
election. So I wrote the chapter which was on 
these states, looking at all of the elections not just 
71How Space Affects Politics
the presidential one. But what was interesting 
about this for me from a spatial-analytic perspec-
tive was the contrast between all of them really 
and Alaska. So in all of them you really have 
what in electoral geography are called ʻswingsʼ
that were more to Obama or more towards the 
Democrats and away from the Republicans. So 
the blue ones were significant swings between 
the 2004 and 2008 elections. And so they show 
areas that are becoming more like – more voting 
Democratic and the red and the light green ones 
are the ones where there was an increased votes 
for the Republicans. So there was some of that 
particularly in the interior parts of California and 
the interior parts of Oregon and Washington.
But what was most interesting was Alaska. 
And of course from a spatial-analytic perspec-
tive immediately you think “What is it thatʼs 
then different about Alaska from the other spa-
tial units?” Well the answerʼs very easy in this 
case. Itʼs the Vice Presidential candidate of the 
Republicans in 2008 was from Alaska. So this 
is whatʼs called in this tradition the friends and 
neighbors voting effect, itʼs a neighborhood effect. 
So Sara Palin, you may remember her, was the 
Vice Presidential candidate of the Republicans 
for their sins, as I would say, and she of course 
was from near Anchorage in Alaska. So you can 
see here, you have a swing that goes in exactly 
the opposite direction from those towards Obama 
in many areas. Interestingly the part of Alaska 
where thereʼs a swing to Obama is the largely 
Inuit or indigenous peopleʼs area over here and it 
was the part of Alaska that had been settled most 
by people from the lower, as they say, the lower 
48 states who tended to vote in larger numbers 
for Senator McCain and Sara Palin. So from the 
spatial-analytic perspective then this would be 
the logic that you would use. You would look at 
areas that were anomalous and say “Well, why 
is that so different from all of the others?” and 
this would be the answer that you would come up 
with.
But from a political-economic perspective 
things could look very different. I mean here look-
ing just at the 2008 election, in terms of popular 
vote by county. Classifying it this way one gets a 
very different picture, particular here donʼt focus 
so much on Alaska but focus on California and 
the other states. Things are more complicated 
than the first one makes it seem. In California, 
for example, thereʼs quite a contrast between 
coastal California, which is where I live, and inte-
rior California here. And anyone whoʼs ever been 
to California knows that this has become a major 
division. This is the most urbanized part, this is 
San Francisco, Bay Area, this is Los Angeles here, 
this is San Diego here. This is coastal California. 
Obviously itʼs the most demographically mixed in 
terms of ethnicities, in terms of large immigrant 
communities especially people from Asia – from 
various Asian countries and from Latin America. 
The interior is much more homogenously white, 
mainly immigrants from other parts of the United 
States plus concentrations of people from Mexico 
who work in agribusiness, in agriculture.
So this is really a division between agricul-
tural California, big, big agriculture in here and 
then the rest of California. And so the areas 
where agribusiness is strong in California in 
2008 were the ones where there was in fact a 
majority of the vote for the Republican, even 
though there was a swing to Obama from 2004 
to 2008. So whatʼs interesting here is that thereʼs 
 an economic pattern here. Itʼs not about friends 
and neighbors voting except thereʼs still a little 
bit of that here obviously, but everywhere else itʼs 
not about some kind of uniform swing that just 
fits a national pattern, itʼs very much about eco-
nomic differences. So economic differences here, 
the nature of the local economy, the nature of the 
local population is what is driving votes, not some 
communication pattern or some anomaly, just 
some kind of anomaly as in this case.
And so the final example of the postmodern one 
focuses more on the rhetoric and claims of politi-
cians and their efforts at cultivating identities. So 
I mean, if youʼre following the recent American 
presidential campaign for 2016, you know the 
degree to which they are all set of cultural themes 
that are driving the candidates, ones relating to 
things like immigration, for example, or cultural 
issues like abortion or same-sex marriage and 
what have you. So here the focus is very much 
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upon the campaign, the political rhetoric and 
political campaigns and particularly what differ-
ent politicians promise to different constituencies. 
So this is a particularly California theme because 
we have at the moment a tremendous shortage 
of water, because of the drought in the American 
west. And so in California at the moment many of 
us would vote for someone who guarantees us all 
of affordable air and affordable water, especially 
the latter one.
And so the postmodern perspective says, “Donʼt 
just look at the map, look at how people are trying 
to mobilize.” Here the focus is on mobilizing 
people, forming different kinds of social and polit-
ical movements, for example, in American politics 
these days the so-called ʻTea Party Movementʼ 
has been very important within the Republican 
Party but isnʼt really part of the party which has 
now become a real problem because their two 
main candidates are Trump and Carson who the 
mainstream Republicans I think are really very 
worried will become the Republican candidate. 
So here the idea is “How do politicians appeal to 
different constituencies?” but also more “How do 
social and political movements articulate their 
goals?” and “How are they different from the 
others?” and in particular “How do they do this 
geographically?” “Which constituencies are they 
appealing to in different places?” because, as you 
probably know, I mean particularly in American 
context presidential elections are not really just 
selections about who gets the most votes but itʼs 
about where you get the votes as well. So Al Gore, 
some of you may remember, won more votes 
than George W. Bush did nationally in 2000, but 
he still lost the election because the election is 
decided on a state-by-state basis, adding across 
the states rather than in terms of who got the 
largest number of popular votes.
4. Places and political identities
Let me try and be a bit briefer with some of 
these other, so we can go through them quickly. 
In terms of places and political identities, here 
you have to guess where this is. So this is a map 
of Belgium and so in this case what we have is a 
language map of Belgium, so the part on here is 
the Dutch speaking part of Belgium, the red area 
is the French speaking part and the Blue is the 
German speaking part, which is relatively minor. 
And then in the middle here on this island is 
Brussels, which is an increasingly multi-cultural 
city and a city thatʼs separate really from the 
rest of Belgium. Thatʼs the Brussels metropoli-
tan area, by the way, not just the municipality. 
Why? Of course the history of Belgium is of being 
in between France and the Netherlands espe-
cially, and the great powers essentially creating 
Belgium. So Belgium again is not a creation from 
some kind of bottom up nationalism. Who are 
the most famous Belgians that you can think of? 
I mean there arenʼt very many, Hercule Poirot, 
the hero of Agatha Christieʼs stories. But only 
because he doesnʼt live in Belgium, he lives 
in London. So the further away you are from 
Belgium the more likely you are to identify as 
a Belgian, I think. But in Belgium people donʼt 
think that much that way. They think that they 
are Flemish or they are Walloon. This is the lan-
guage that they use, Dutch-speaking or French-
speaking. And so thereʼs a very strong association 
between where you are from in Belgium then and 
your political identity. And this means that the 
Belgian identity is extremely weak. Itʼs a very 
weak national identity and where you have a 
very, very strong regional identities here. And so 
in a spatial-analytic perspective what one sees 
is that – one looks again for anomalies and itʼs 
Brussels that is the anomaly here, that doesnʼt 
really fit in and [in] the rest of the country you 
really do have these two competing political 
identities that are very strongly attached to 
particular regions and Brussels where it doesnʼt 
really work, it doesnʼt really operate.
So that is a neat kind of mapping of language 
onto political identity. So here we have – this 
is a photograph of two guys in South Central 
Los Angeles. This is the district of Watts in Los 
Angeles. This is or historically was very much an 
African-American or black neighborhood, very 
high levels of racial segregation. 95%-98% of the 
population in this area historically was African-
American and really marginalized within the 
economy of Los Angeles. So until the 1960s there 
73How Space Affects Politics
were many jobs in manufacturing industries 
located close to this area. But in the 1970s and 
1980s most of these factories closed down; they 
disappeared. So from a political-economic per-
spective what one sees is the neighborhood like 
this not only got a high level of residential seg-
regation but also very low levels of employment. 
The majority of the population today in this 
neighborhood is either unemployed or works in 
the so-called underground economy but marginal-
ized within the larger metropolitan area.
And so the political identity of people in a 
neighborhood like this is very much those of 
people who find themselves on the edge of the 
rest of society. So electoral participation, for 
example, is very, very low; very few people par-
ticipate in national elections. So for example, 
even in 2012 when the candidate was African-
American, Barack Obama, the turnout in this 
area was less than 15%. So this [is] a measure of 
a degree of political demoralization of a political 
feeling on the edge of national politics. And in fact 
in this neighborhood the only time that tends to 
mobilize people politically is when there is some 
kind of event like shooting by the police or some 
other activity that then mobilizes people, usually 
in relation to the police force. So the political 
identity here is of people embattled against main-
stream society. This neighborhood where this 
photograph was taken is just a few streets north 
of the district of Los Angeles called Compton. 
So anyone who knows the history of rap music 
knows about Compton because this is where 
many of the early important rap artists, hip-
hop musicians at least on the West Coast – West 
Coast rap were from this district, which again, if 
you know the lyrics of the rap songs youʼll know 
that it has a political message but itʼs one that 
relates to being marginalized politically through 
the places in which people find themselves living.
The final set of example of place and political 
identity is also here taken from Los Angeles. So 
the red area on the small map is Los Angeles 
County and then this is the county, up large here, 
and circled here is one particular area which was 
historically what is called, in American local gov-
ernment language, unincorporated, which meant 
that it didnʼt have its own local government at 
all, in this case, until 1984. And this is a district 
in Los Angeles called West Hollywood. So itʼs 
right next to Beverly Hills, Beverly Hills is here, 
which is one of the most affluent neighborhoods 
in Los Angeles. This is Santa Monica here; this is 
where I live, right there. And so West Hollywood 
for many years was – all the services were pro-
vided by the county. So the police was the Sheriff, 
the fire department was the county, and so it 
didnʼt have its own services at all. And so it was 
incorporated in 1984.
Whatʼs interesting here is about how this hap-
pened. And this is a history of an area that the 
main people who were behind this were a group 
of gay men, of men who had moved to this neigh-
borhood partly because you have to – one has to 
acknowledge historically it was not policed very 
heavily by either the Los Angeles police depart-
ment or by the Beverly Hills police department. 
And so it was an area that it attracted, over the 
years, a fairly significant number of people who 
you could regard and have thought of themselves 
as having been rejected by the mainstream soci-
ety. But they made an effort and were successful 
in the 1980s in creating a new municipality of 
West Hollywood. So today for example, the Mayor 
of West Hollywood and most of the councilors are 
gay. So what we have here is the creation in a 
sense of using a place as a mechanism to try and 
make an identity, in this case a political identity, 
itʼs not just a cultural one but a political identity 
legitimate – about in a sense trying to legitimize 
a group who otherwise would be regarded or his-
torically anyway in the United States have been 
regarded as illegitimate. So itʼs an interesting 
example. I would hasten to say there arenʼt that 
many examples like this, but it shows how a 
place can become a mechanism for creating and 
legitimizing a particular identity.
5. Geographies of nationalism and ethnic 
conflict
So finally then [we move to] the three examples 
of looking at the geographies of nationalism and 
ethnic conflict from the three perspectives. Hereʼs 
another of these sort of blank maps. In this 
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case, this is the regions of Spain. And of course, 
from this perspective whatʼs interesting is why 
some regions like Catalonia here – the Basque 
Provinces here, and to a lesser extent Galicia up 
here. These are the regions in Spain where you 
actually have autonomist and sometimes separa-
tist movements. And now from a spatial-analytic 
perspective the interest is more “Why are these 
all peripheral?” So the tendency is to think of 
it in terms of, again, geographical peripheral-
ity. Catalonia on the border, obviously, with 
France and the Basque provinces also looking 
out towards across the Bay of Biscay and then 
Galicia being very close to Portuguese and in fact 
Galician language not being that distinctive from 
Portuguese.
So youʼve got these rather peripheral regions 
and historically youʼve had a very centralized gov-
ernment particularly during the Franco period. 
So from 1939, 1940 until 1974, Spain had a very, 
very centralized system. But before that time the 
system had been much looser and so Catalonia 
and Basque provinces which speak really quite 
different languages from mainstream Spanish 
or Castilian, those two regions had a degree of 
local autonomy. So following the changes of 1974 
to 1976, there was a decision made to in fact 
evolve powers particularly to these regions, to 
the Basque province and to Catalonia. Partly 
this was the reaction to the already existing and 
insurgency amongst the Basques. So there had 
been a violent guerilla movement in the 1960s 
and 1970s that was trying to undermine the rule 
of the central government over the Basque region. 
But the general emphasis here will be placed on 
the peripherality of the distance to Madrid and 
the history of some kind of pre-existing self-rule 
in these regions compared to the rest of Spain. 
And that would be the explanation.
And using the Italian example for the second 
perspective, this is the percentage of the vote 
achieved by the Italian Northern League in 2008 
national election. And you can see here, I mean 
the Northern League was founded really in the 
early 1980s but really only came to the fore in 
the 1990s, at that time separatist movement had 
since changed its rhetoric enormously to become 
an anti-immigrant party more recently. But back 
in – as recently as 2008 it still officially had a 
policy of separating Northern Italy, which they 
called Padania, from the rest of Italy and you can 
see here the relative levels of support in Northern 
and Central Italy. Well, this movement was very 
open; it was actually based around economic 
issues. It was based around the fact that this is 
the richest part of Italy, by far, and a lot of their 
tax revenues were being collected and then were 
being sent southwards to Southern Italy and to 
the islands, which are much poorer parts of the 
country.
So their argument was against that. They were 
the Italy that produces. That was the argument 
that they used and that Rome was a thief. They 
had this catch phrase, “Roma Ladrona,” which 
in translation means Rome, the thief – Rome 
as the capital city sucking in resources from 
the north and then sending them south, and 
partly this reflected the nature of Italian politics. 
The exchange politics or clientelism was much 
stronger in Southern Italy than it was in the 
north, but it also reflected the fact that any nation 
state redistributes some of the wealth from richer 
regions to poor ones. But in this case it was really 
very much an economic based movement even 
in its own rhetoric. So the argument here would 
be from a political-economic perspective that 
the Italy – the most productive part of Italy was 
in a sense turning against the other part of the 
country because the redistributive powers of the 
state in a sense now outstripped the legitimacy 
– the political legitimacy of the state in taking 
those revenues and redistributing them to poorer 
people and to the poorer region. Yes, I should 
have said that this is also in the context where 
Italy is actually in a period of economic decline. 
And so many of the industries in the north are 
feeling very embattled, many of their products 
are now faced with competition from China and 
so on and some of the firms themselves are now 
off shoring to Eastern Europe or to China as well.
So the third example is – back again, this is the 
postmodern sort of approach to nationalism, is to 
focus much more again on what is at stake here 
in terms of peopleʼs representations of themselves 
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and of the past. And in a lot of work in political 
geography the focus is on what in French are 
often called like ʻlieux de mémoire,ʼ places of 
memory, the ways in which the nation or the 
group, if itʼs a regional group, is remembered and 
commemorated. And of course one of the impor-
tant points to grasp I think about nationalism 
is that commemoration and celebration are very 
closely connected to one another. Remembering 
past events isnʼt just important in its own right, 
but in a sense itʼs also about then celebrating 
those events as well. Now trying to separate out 
these two things is of course very difficult.
This is the Cenotaph, which is in Whitehall 
in London and it has various flags of the British 
Air Force, the Army and the Navy here. And on 
the side its written, which is similar to ones you 
find in other countries, “our glorious dead,” the 
people who died in previous wars fighting for the 
nation, and weʼre all familiar with this. This is 
like an equivalent of – this is the London shrine, 
if you like, for the remembering, particularly 
World War I but also other wars as well including 
colonial wars. So this is a place where in a sense 
– this is the focal point of memory, a focal point of 
memory of the nation and of its past. And partly, 
itʼs about commemoration and I think many of us 
donʼt have so much problem with that. Itʼs more 
when it switches from commemoration to celebra-
tion that in a sense then itʼs about reproducing 
the same sort of historic sentiments as well. And 
I think the postmodern approach to nationalism 
then tends to focus on the buildings, the very 
specific sites in which memory – in which com-
memoration takes place. So commemoration – so 
in a sense trying to reconstruct the representa-
tions that lie at the heart of nationalism, which is 
an appeal to a collective past and in particular to 
collective sacrifice. Collective sacrifice, in a sense 
then justifies the continuing existence of the 
nation, thatʼs the minimal expectation, but then 
also the celebration of the nation as well.
V. Emerging themes
1. Geographical scale
So I hope those examples helped to illustrate 
the connection between the sub areas – on the 
subject areas on the one hand and then the 
theoretical perspectives that have I think been 
dominant in American political geography over 
the last 30 or 40 years – so Iʼm sorry, it feels like 
maybe Iʼve been here for 30 or 40 years. What 
I wanted to do at the close though is to point to 
some things that it isnʼt – the field isnʼt just sort 
of fixed; itʼs always moving, which is why the title 
of the book is Making Political Geography  in the 
sense that itʼs always a project in formation. And 
I just wanted to identify what I think are three 
of the most important – and I donʼt mean to sug-
gest that theyʼre the only ones, but in addition to 
what weʼve been talking about increasingly in the 
American literature in political geography, these 
are the three of the themes that I think have 
become most significant, particularly over the 
last 10 years or so. I think I had a bit of a better 
discussion earlier on here.
So these three themes are ʻgeographical scale,ʼ 
ʻpolitics of the environmentʼ and – itʼs what Iʼm 
going to call ʻnormative political geography.ʼ So if 
you look at the main journals today like Political 
Geography  or Geopolitics , Space and Polity  in 
the English language journals, youʼll see these 
are – increasingly these are beginning to appear 
alongside all of the things that Iʼve just been 
talking about. One of these – which is in essence 
a kind of, what you can call like, meta-theoretical 
issue, as much as a substantive area or a subject 
area is thinking with geographical scale. So this 
is more in terms of how to think about things 
more than something in itself. And here one can 
think of various topics that could be addressed. 
Iʼll give an example of terrorism in a minute, 
addressed using geographical scale. That may 
be better than thinking entirely just in terms 
of a world thatʼs sort of flat, where there are no 
differences between the local, the national, the 
global and so on. What I have in mind here is the 
idea that the human behavior, human action, is 
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always framed in a kind of telescopic way. And 
some of the terms we use are conventions like 
local or regional or national or international or 
global. I mean, so the language itself is one that 
weʼve inherited.
But often these are pretty good surrogates for 
levels or scales at which things happen differen-
tially. And so we know there are things that are 
where the cause is or the reasons for things are 
just local. And we know there are other things 
that in essence are the result of causes operating 
from a larger scale and then having local conse-
quences. And so here the idea is if we think with 
scale, we can end up with rather better explana-
tions than if we think just at the state level, just 
at the local level and so on. And one of the issues 
here is that most of the social sciences are set up 
at a particular scale. Think of a field like political 
science which arguably is close to political geog-
raphy. There you have people who studied the 
politics of particular countries, Japanese politics, 
American politics and so on. Sometimes, they 
just look at the country as a whole, sometimes 
they are a bit more sensitive to local, regional 
and national levels, but typically they look at 
national institutions. Then you have specialists 
in comparative politics who compare countries to 
one another. So we compare Japan to the United 
States or we compare Italy to Britain or what-
ever. And then we have the field of international 
politics or international relations which operates 
largely – Iʼm pleased to say not entirely anymore, 
but largely at the level of states, talking in terms of 
states that bang up against one another.
And so thatʼs the intellectual division of labor 
that weʼve come to have. I think one of the great 
contributions of geography in general and polit-
ical geography more specifically is to, in a sense, 
try and introduce geographical scale into these 
different fields, to point out there really isnʼt – I 
mean thereʼs not just the Japanese politics. Just 
think, for example, of a lot of the most important 
issues at the moment in Japanese politics, ones 
relating to things like the base – the U.S. marine 
base in Okinawa or questions relating to the pol-
icies of The Bank of Japan, in terms of setting 
interest rates or so-called quantitative easing. 
These are questions that donʼt just involve Japan 
but the governor of The Bank of Japan of course 
spends a lot of time consulting with the Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve in the United States and 
the head of the European Central Bank and so 
on.
So the point Iʼm trying to make is that there 
isnʼt this kind of essential independence at a cer-
tain scale of these different units and yet weʼve 
become trapped in this. And this was – I wrote a 
paper in the early 1990s called the territorial trap 
which was essentially – it was directed more at 
the field of international relations than it was 
anywhere else, but it was in a sense arguing that 
we canʼt think of what happens out in the world, 
as if it was always in terms of these levels – these 
levels are not separate from one another and we 
need to acknowledge them and to understand 
that what happens anywhere in relation to a par-
ticular phenomenon is always being funneled or 
channeled in some way across these scales. This 
is a difficult topic to deal with.
So the second – well, Iʼll come back and go 
through – do you want me to go through the 
example now for terrorism? So I have an example 
of each of these. So letʼs look at the terrorism one 
that I use. If you just look at it locally, this is a 
map of Africa, of people killed in conflicts involv-
ing so-called jihadists, however thatʼs classified 
in Africa, from 2009 to 2015. This is from The 
Economist  magazine, the London magazine. And 
what it shows are particularly these two large 
concentrations, one in Nigeria or almost entirely 
actually in the northeastern region of Nigeria, so 
not in the whole of Nigeria at all, and then the 
other in Somalia and over the border into Kenya. 
And you can see here in terms of numbers, these 
two completely outnumber the others in terms of 
the significance. At least in as far as numbers of 
people killed they are the most important, and 
the other ones are scattered and perhaps less 
important.
Well, for one strategy [it] would be just to 
focus on the local origins of these movements. 
You would say “Well, this is largely to do with 
the failed state of Somalia, the collapse of 
Somalia and the rise of Islamist movements 
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in Somalia.” Boko Haram has much more to 
do with actually between – and this would be 
the local level explanation – enmities between 
Christians and Moslems in Nigeria and particu-
larly in Northeastern Nigeria. So that would 
be a complete local or completely local story or 
local account. And actual fact [is that] if we look 
further into these groups one discovers that, for 
example, most of their funding comes from out-
side of these regions. They are funded largely 
by money from Saudi Arabia and from the Gulf 
states. Thereʼs lots of evidence of this in terms 
of buying weapons and so on and so forth. So 
there are these external linkages. And you can 
see this, you could say “Well, thatʼs a network 
effect.” I mean you could definitely think of it 
that way, but in many ways what you have are 
really tiers or levels of responsibility, because the 
same people in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states 
who are financing these people are also financ-
ing other people in other places as well. And so 
they are higher up a hierarchy. One of the things 
that geographical scale helps us, I think, with is 
this notion that we actually donʼt live in a flat 
world, we live in a very hierarchical world. We 
live in a world in which many powerful powers in 
a sense are a kind of descent across scales from 
particular nodes, from particular places. But this 
is not what in Internet terms is called a reticular 
network. This is a hierarchical network. So some 
nodes are much more important than others and 
we can think of those as being at a higher scale 
than the others, so one part of this is definitely 
that, itʼs this funding relationship.
But also these groups, as you may be aware, 
have branded themselves in global terms. Neither 
of these now refers to themselves entirely as 
local activists or local operatives. Both of them 
have in a sense identified either with Al Qaeda or 
with the Islamic State, over the last six months 
or so. So theyʼre in fact branding themselves as 
global brands. So even though they are operat-
ing in these very particular settings, these local 
settings, and the local causes are still important, 
thatʼs not point, those things matter enormously. 
But theyʼre also parts of this larger, overarch-
ing hierarchical system. So if you want to really 
understand them, you have to understand that. 
You canʼt just look at them at one particular 
scale. Itʼs got to be across all of these scales if you 
want to effectively understand them. Part of our 
problem at the moment from a kind of policy point of 
view is that we donʼt do this. We think of them all 
either as completely isolated with local causes or 
we think of them as just a giant global enterprise, 
when in fact itʼs neither of those things. Itʼs some-
thing in between.
2. Politics of the environment
So the second emerging theme is – and thereʼs 
some irony in this given that in many ways political 
geography came out of an environmental determin-
ist tradition in the late 19th century but now weʼ
ve discovered the opposite relationship, the degree 
to which humans in a sense are now affecting the 
global environment and the consequences of that 
for the future. And there are number of examples 
here, many of which youʼre probably familiar 
with. One of the most important ones is the focus 
on what now is called environmental security. 
So, this is like “Whatʼs going to be the political 
consequences of climate change?” for example, 
“Which parts of the world are more likely to be 
affected by this?” – presumably more lower lying 
areas where regions somewhere like Bangladesh 
would be a good case, but then “What are the 
longer term consequences of that in terms of 
political impacts, in terms of what will happen to 
the people who are affected by this?” and so on. 
So thatʼs certainly one side of it.
Then thereʼs so-called green geopolitics or 
which often is attached to questions of environ-
mental movements or environmental movements 
geared towards trying to make environmental 
issues more important on political agendas, and 
then finally, one issue that became particularly 
important in China in the early 2000 is the whole 
question – well, generally – of pollution, air pollu-
tion and water pollution, but more specifically of 
the pollution of the global food chain. The degree 
to which thereʼre increased toxic elements in the 
food that we consume, partly is a product of the 
scale at which food now is being produced and 
moved over long distances and so on. So there are 
78 John Agnew
any number of these. I have an example. This is 
only one example of this, what Iʼm interested in, 
which from a geopolitical point of view is particu-
larly interesting.
This is a series of maps of what I call the plas-
tic mattresses or plastic concentrations in the 
various oceans. The top one is the Pacific, the 
second one is the Atlantic, and the third one is 
the Indian Ocean. And what these maps show is 
the relative density and circulation of what are 
mainly plastic materials, but thereʼs also other 
stuff that gets trapped in this, plastic bottles, 
little bits of plastic, micro plastics of one kind or 
another and how these circulate. Now, Iʼm not 
particularly either equipped intellectually or 
that interested in the actual physical geography 
of these things. What interests me is the whole 
question of the governance or regulational lack 
thereof, of these particular spaces. As you know, 
even though we have economic zones around 
particular countries, there is really no essential 
authority over the oceans or over the water. And 
so essentially these have become like dump-
ing grounds for the refuse of modern industrial 
society.
So the question arises, “How can we invent 
governance mechanisms or regulatory mech-
anisms to try and address problems like this, 
problems that transcend any particular countryʼs 
borders?” because, as we know, effectively in the 
world today environmental regulation is either 
done by national or local governments or itʼs not 
done at all. And so this is an example, a good 
one, I think, of how there is a mismatch between 
a major global problem on the one hand and in 
our capacity, politically and governmentally to 
address that question on the other, which is why 
we end up then with all this stuff being dumped 
in what is a common resource, whatever. But 
rather like the air where we pump all kinds of 
stuff into it and donʼt address the question of how 
that then has consequences for people at some 
distance away, so we do this into the oceans. So 
this is a particularly dramatic example I think 
of an environmental problem that needs to be 
addressed politically and governmentally.
3. Normative political geography
And the final emerging theme as I see it in 
American political geography is this focus on 
what have often been important questions in 
political theory, which have never really been 
addressed as geographical questions, so-called 
normative political geography, by which I mean 
very obvious questions of values, questions 
of judgment about what is right or wrong, for 
example – so questions of ethical, making ethical 
distinctions and so on. One area where thereʼs 
been quite a lot of writing recently is on so-called 
transnational democracy, which is “Would this nec-
essarily have to take very territorialized forms?” 
for example, “Would it have to be a global feder-
alism?” or something like that. Well, I and other 
people have made arguments very much against 
that kind of model and argued much more for 
functionally specific sorts of democracy, govern-
ance over certain kinds of networks, for example. 
So if youʼre interested in questions relating to 
foreign investment, for example, across countries 
and the current or complete absence of any sort 
of democratic accountability for that, if thatʼs of 
something that interests you, then the question 
is “How would one go about instituting some 
kind of institutional mechanisms for regulating 
that across different countries?” and so on. But 
that strikes to me as being a more useful strategy 
than thinking up some kind of scaled-up version 
of the nation state for the world as a whole. But 
that would be an example of a kind of normative 
theorizing about how to organize democracy. 
Secondary, whatʼs been very important in 
contemporary geography is the discussion of 
new kinds of weapons and in particular, many 
of you are probably familiar with this, the use of 
the drone – of drones as a substitute for human 
forces, but increasingly also discussions of robotic 
forces and so on as well and raising issues about 
the use of those weapons which seem to devolve 
responsibility then onto machines and away from 
humans. But also thereʼs been quite a bit of writ-
ing recently about things like aerial bombing or 
bombardment, which has become increasingly 
the modus operandi , particularly of the American 
military. So for example, the interventions 
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recently in Syria and Iraq have largely taken the 
form of bombing.
But anyone who knows much about the his-
tory of bombing knows that actually its often 
quite ineffective as a military strategy in terms 
of meeting different kinds of objectives. And so 
thereʼs a quite a lot of discussion of these kinds 
of things and particularly, given that this is 
a political geographical discussion, questions 
relating to how this shrinks distance, how these 
weapons can be manipulated over long distances, 
for example. The pilots of drones – many of the 
drones operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
or so on – are actually located in Nevada in the 
United States. So thereʼs this huge physical dis-
tance between the controller on the one hand and 
then the outcome, if you like, on the other. This 
is an instance where warfare now is being, in a 
sense, fought at a distance.
And then the final two examples I have are 
“Why should we care about people who we donʼt 
know?” I mean this may sound like a very banal 
question, but why should we care for distant 
strangers? This was a question that the great 
political theorists always asked in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, people like David Hume and 
Adam Smith. Shouldnʼt we just care about people 
around about us? David Hume had this idea of 
concentric zones, and we all do this. I mean, we 
care more for our children and for obvious reason 
and for our families and so on. But do our respon-
sibilities extend beyond those, the familial kin, 
the national and so on out into the rest of the 
world? And some people have been making the 
argument – not just a utilitarian type of argu-
ment, which is that itʼs good for us to care about 
other people because in a sense, thereʼs a quid pro 
quo . If we care for them, theyʼll care for us. But 
in a way thereʼs a kind of basic humanity that 
demands that if other people are systematically 
degraded in some way. This arises in connection 
with the whole refugee issue in Europe and in 
relation to American policies on taking refugees. 
Particularly, whatʼs your moral responsibility if 
you start a war and then donʼt take the refugees 
from it? I mean these are normative questions, 
these are questions of morality but they also 
are ones that arise in very specific geographical 
contexts when we are tied someway to people at 
some distance away from us.
And so these are difficult questions, in a sense 
you could say thereʼs no one answer to any of 
these, but these are questions that increasingly 
people are wanting to ask. And then finally, one 
area where Iʼve actually been more and more 
interested in is the question of what can be called 
the geopolitics of knowledge. Iʼm here today talk-
ing about American political geography. Well, 
why should you care about American political 
geography? In a way, thereʼs a kind of interest-
ing geopolitical issue here which is that in many 
ways itʼs the worldʼs most powerful universities, 
itʼs the most powerful states. They are the ones 
that in many ways produce the knowledge that 
then circulates around the world. And I mean 
sometimes it actually may be good knowledge, 
my point isnʼt that itʼs therefore always tainted 
as knowledge, that itʼs always like bad knowl-
edge because itʼs from Harvard or somewhere 
other. My point is more that it means that certain 
knowledge gets way far more attention than other 
knowledge does, simply because of where it comes 
from and who articulates it and who spreads it.
And so my interest is in really addressing this 
question, more especially, in my case to ideas 
about international relations and global politics 
and so on, but more how should we not listen to 
voices from other places and how can those voices 
be incorporated, given for example the hegem-
ony of English, which is our challenge today. You 
know, he speaks in English and Takashi has to 
translate it into Japanese. Now on one level some 
of this communication is always going to be inev-
itable. There is always a question of translation, 
but if it is always a question of translating from 
English into something else, then thatʼs a prob-
lem. Thatʼs the point that I am trying to make. It 
should be more of a two-way street. So that was 
the last thing.
I had an example of this which is more about 
ideas that we are living increasingly just in one 
world. When people talk about the Internet in 
a very idealistic way, increased planetary con-
sciousness, we are all on this planet together 
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even though there are people who want to go 
Mars, most of us think that our future is here. 
But in fact, if you look at the email traffic and a 
colleague of mine, actually in physics produced 
this mainly from getting information from serv-
ers all over the world on email traffic. And then 
he classified it. He was trying to look at this sort 
of clash of civilizations idea. There are essentially 
these kinds of global-cultural groups: Chinese, 
Islamic and so on. After a while, this classifica-
tion breaks down. It is incoherent classification, I 
think. You know African is a locational attribute 
not a cultural one.
But anyway, if you do code them on here, you 
see that there is an incredible amount of cluster-
ing still, that there is still an immense geography 
in the network sense to the way in which email 
works. One of the most clustered is Latin-
American here which formed its own sub-graph, 
and it does say a lot of them have other linkages 
but the densest linkages tend to be between 
neighbors still, between adjacent countries. There 
are some interesting – and Japan is interesting. 
You will see up here because Japan actually is 
much more, in terms of email traffic, cosmopoli-
tan or staying anywhere else on Earth in terms 
of linkages to East Asia, to North America and to 
Europe and so on, and so it is unclassifiable. But 
most countries, in fact, fit very much into these 
kinds of classifications. And so this is obviously 
linguistic. In case of Latin America, it is mainly 
Spanish-speaking countries, but it is also more 
than that. There is also a very, very strong geo-
graphical element to this. That always suggests 
that we actually still donʼt live in a world that is 
singular where we have the world as an entire 
pinhead or something single point. But in fact, it 
is still very geographically structured.
And from a normative point of view, this is very 
interesting because it suggests that there are still 
things that need to be done. I mean, if people are 
living very much in more limited communication 
networks, then that obviously poses a challenge 
to creating any kind of sense of greater planetary 
consciousness. So there are possibilities here 
that more empirically informed research helps us 
then in exploring these more normative questions 
about global consciousness, global sense of 
belonging and so on. What this suggests is that 
people still are very much locked in to very spe-
cific types of communication network and they 
were all the examples that I had. So, thank you.
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